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1. Introduction 
We present new experiments studying determinants of the ‘endowment effect’ (see Thaler, 
1980; Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1990, 1991). We use the term to refer to a behavioural 
tendency for people to value goods more highly when they own them, relative to when they do 
not. The simplest experiments demonstrating endowment effects involve variants of Knetsch’s 
(1989) ‘swapping task’. When subjects are randomly endowed with one of two items and then 
given the opportunity to swap their endowment for the other item, the majority choose not to 
swap. This is an anomaly relative to standard preference theory which predicts a trading rate 
of 50%. Studies which show that willingness-to-accept valuations for goods are often 
significantly higher than willingness-to-pay valuations have also been interpreted as evidence 
of endowment effects.1 Endowment effects have been found for both a wide range of goods 
(lotteries, mugs, candy, toys, memorabilia, stationery, food and drink) and subjects (children, 
undergraduates, and non-student adults).  
Although the endowment effect has been widely observed, evidence suggests it may be 
eroded by certain kinds of experience. Much of the existing evidence relates to the influence 
of various forms of market experience. For example, when valuations are elicited repeatedly in 
experimental markets, the gap between willingness-to-accept and willingness-to-pay usually 
decays (e.g. Shogren et al., 2001; Loomes, Starmer and Sugden,  2003). List (2003, 2004) 
reports that experienced traders in a naturally occurring market show no endowment effect. 
Engelmann and Hollard (2010) find that subjects who have previously been ‘forced’ to trade 
exhibit no endowment effect in subsequent swapping tasks.  
We focus on experiences that are separable from market participation. We investigate two 
types of experience that arise commonly in daily life and which, we conjectured, might 
influence the extent of an endowment effect: these are experiences arising, respectively, from 
consuming and from choosing goods. In the next section, we discuss background theory. 
Section 3 sets out our experimental design, Section 4 presents results, Section 5 reports the 
results of a follow-up experiment and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Background theory 
We draw on a theory proposed by Loomes, Orr and Sugden (2009) (henceforth LOS) to 
motivate our experiment. LOS propose a model of consumer choice which predicts the 
endowment effect as a consequence of two factors: individuals are uncertain about the utility 
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an alternative will deliver and they are loss averse. In LOS, preferences are defined over 
consumption bundles. Each bundle x is a set of consumption characteristics represented as an 
act (Savage 1954), which associates a specific utility Us(x) with each element s, of a state space 
S. The state space represents ‘taste uncertainty’ which can arise from extrinsic or intrinsic 
sources. For example, when in a restaurant and considering the act “order fish”, extrinsic 
uncertainty may exist in relation to whether the fish will be cooked well or not, while intrinsic 
uncertainty might reflect an individual’s lack of clarity about their own preference (e.g. not 
being sure whether one is in the mood for fish2).  
How LOS explain the endowment effect can be illustrated with a simple example.  Imagine 
a choice between two acts x and y, defined over two equally probable states of the world, s1 
and s2. Act x yields utility of 1 in s1 and 0 in s2. Act y yields utility of 0 in s1 and 1 in s2. Assume 
that y is the status quo and consider the option of switching to x. Under s1, switching would 
provide a gain in utility of 1 and under s2 switching results in a loss in utility of 1. When faced 
with this uncertainty, a consumer who is loss-averse in utility would maintain the status quo 
(regardless of whether this was x or y); hence, there is an endowment effect. 
2.1. The taste uncertainty hypothesis 
A distinctive property of the LOS model is that “the strength of status quo effects is positively 
related to the extent of taste uncertainty” (LOS, p.132). The intuition follows from the previous 
example. In the absence of taste uncertainty, either s1 or s2 occur for sure. The individual then 
has a strict preference ranking of the two acts which is independent of the status quo.3 It follows 
that experiences which reduce taste uncertainty can, other things equal, weaken the endowment 
effect. We call this the taste uncertainty hypothesis and in Section 3 we present an experiment 
designed to test it. 
2.2. The choice experience hypothesis 
Our experiment was also designed to test the conjecture that prior experiences of making 
choices between specific goods may weaken a subsequent endowment effect, relative to those 
goods. We call this conjecture the choice experience hypothesis. While we do not know of a 
current theory which specifically predicts this, more than one plausible psychological 
mechanism might work in this direction.  
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 One interpretation of the endowment effect is that prior endowments create biases, causing 
stated preferences to deviate from underlying preferences (Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) 
and Plott (1996) offer interpretations in this spirit). Given a bias interpretation, it is possible 
that prior experiences of choosing between a pair of goods, pre-endowment, could diminish 
any subsequent endowment effect. Imagine, for instance, an individual who accumulated 
multiple experiences via considering the ranking of a pair of alternatives from different initial 
endowment positions (e.g. owning one, owning the other, or owning neither). It seems plausible 
to suppose that such experiences might provide an individual with perspective on their own 
preferences which renders them less susceptible to bias.  
 In addition to the possible debiasing role of prior choice, other possible mechanisms might 
cause prior choice to reduce an endowment effect. For example, as explained above, in the 
LOS model the strength of the endowment effect may be positively related to the degree of 
intrinsic uncertainty associated with a choice. So, if making a choice between two goods 
reduces vacillation in subsequent decisions over the same pair of goods (perhaps, for instance, 
because the individual has some preference for consistency), that would provide another 
conduit for operation of the choice experience hypothesis, consistent with the LOS model.   
3. The experiment 
We test the taste uncertainty hypothesis by investigating whether consumption experience, in 
an environment where subjects are uncertain about how much they will enjoy available 
alternatives, reduces the endowment effect. We do this by comparing behaviour in two 
treatments which we label BASELINE and TASTING.  These two treatments are represented 
in the left-hand tree in Figure 1. 
Our BASELINE treatment was a variant of Knetsch’s (1989) classic swapping task, where 
subjects were randomly allocated one of two possible endowments and then given the 
opportunity to either stick or swap. On Figure 1, the treatment began at the circular node 
denoting the random allocation. The swap decision is denoted by the shaded square nodes.  
Relative to the classic task, our BASELINE treatment has two distinguishing features. The first 
is that the goods which comprised the endowments were consumption goods selected in the 
expectation that subjects would be unsure how much they might like them. The two goods were 
premium organic vegetable crisps and handmade organic lemonade (for full details see the 
supplementary materials). The goods were supplied by specialist wholesalers and had similar 
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retail prices of approximately £2. The limited availability and premium nature of the goods 
meant that subjects were unlikely to have tasted them before. The second distinctive feature of 
our BASELINE treatment was that each endowment was a bundle of goods rather than a single 
object: each subject was randomly endowed with either a ‘crisps-rich’ bundle consisting of two 
packets of crisps and a single bottle of lemonade (which we denote ccl) or a ‘lemonade-rich’ 
bundle consisting of a single packet of crisps and two bottles of lemonade (denoted cll). The 
rationale for using bundles is explained below.  
The TASTING treatment was identical to the BASELINE treatment except that each subject 
consumed a small amount of the two goods before being endowed with their bundle.  Starting 
at the top of Figure 1, the treatment began with a subject tasting samples of each good. The 
experimenter then allocated one of the two endowments at random. This procedure placed each 
subject at one of the shaded decision nodes where they were faced with a choice between 
sticking with their allocated endowment or swapping it for the other one. This decision 
determined a final allocation which was theirs to keep and take from the experiment. 
Under conventional preference theory in which endowments play no role, even if tasting 
changes a subject’s ranking of the bundles, each subject has a 50% chance of not being 
endowed with their most preferred bundle. Hence, we should expect a 50% chance of swapping 
in both the BASELINE and TASTING treatments. 
Figure 1: The Treatments 
  
Given the assumptions that (i) the goods used in our experiment are ones for which individuals 
would have taste uncertainty and that (ii) consuming small quantities of these goods would 
reduce taste uncertainty, the comparison of behaviour in the BASELINE and TASTING 
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treatments provides a simple test of the hypothesis that taste uncertainty contributes to the 
endowment effect. On that hypothesis, we should expect the endowment effect to be relatively 
weaker in the TASTING treatment. 
Our second main objective was to test the choice experience hypothesis. Our test involves a 
comparison of two treatments which we label CHOOSING and PASSIVE. These treatments 
employ a novel variant of the swapping task that involves sequences of choices. It facilitates a 
test of the choice experience hypothesis by requiring subjects to choose between the two goods 
en route to their endowment while, nevertheless, ensuring that they receive a random 
endowment of goods before facing the swap decision.  
The PASSIVE and CHOOSING treatments are described by the right-hand tree in Figure 1. 
The only difference between them is what happened at the first node at the top of the figure. In 
CHOOSING, the first node was a decision node at which subjects chose either one packet of 
crisps or one bottle of lemonade, which they were then physically given. A random device then 
determined a ‘top-up’ to their endowment, so that with equal probability they would find 
themselves with either a crisps-rich or a lemonade-rich bundle.4 This placed the subject at one 
of the four shaded choice nodes in the lower part of Figure 1. Subjects then chose whether to 
stick with their endowment or swap it for the other bundle. The PASSIVE treatment was 
exactly the same, except that the initial component of the endowment (at the first node) was 
determined by chance rather than by the subject’s own choice.  
This “top-up” method ensures that the bundle held at the point of the swap decision is 
randomly determined in both the PASSIVE and CHOOSING treatments, and note that it is 
independent of the initial choice in the latter. Hence, the prediction of a 50% swap rate based 
on standard theory applies to both. Comparing behaviour between these treatments provides a 
test of the choice experience hypothesis. On that hypothesis, we should expect more swaps in 
the CHOOSING treatment than in the PASSIVE treatment. 
To test our hypotheses, 210 subjects recruited at the University of Nottingham, were 
randomly assigned to our four treatments. Each treatment had around 50 subjects. For an effect 
size with Cohen's h=0.5 (approximately the difference between a 0.25 and a 0.5 swap rate) and 
a 0.05 significance level, the power is 80% for within treatment tests (i.e. tests for an 
endowment effect) and 70% for between treatment tests (i.e. tests for differences in swap rates). 
Following the swap decision, each subject completed a questionnaire. This provides 
information on individual characteristics which we exploit in the analysis of Section 4.  Full 
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details of the goods, the tasks and the scripts followed by the experimenters are described in 
the supplementary materials.  
4. Results 
Table 1 reports swap rates by treatment. The Endowments column shows the number of 
subjects initially endowed with each of the two bundles. The Swaps column reports the total 
number of swaps and (in parentheses) the number of swaps in each possible direction: 
swapping crisps for lemonade (c→l) or lemonade for crisps (c←l). The Swap rate is the 
proportion of subjects who swapped. The final column reports p-values for Boschloo tests of 
the null hypothesis (based on standard preference theory) that the final allocation is 
independent of endowment (i.e. there is 50% swapping rate), against the alternative hypothesis 
that there is an endowment effect (i.e. the swap rate is less than 50%)5.  
Table 1: Endowments and trading by treatment 
Treatment N Endowments 
(ccl, cll) 
Swaps 
 total (c→l, c←l) 
Swap rate P-Value 
 
       
BASELINE 50 (25, 25) 21 (10, 11) 0.42 0.1611 
TASTING 56 (27, 29) 26 (16, 10) 0.46 0.3460 
Total 106 (52, 54) 47 (26, 21) 0.44 0.1394 
       
PASSIVE 52 (26, 26) 12 (6, 6) 0.23 0.0001 
CHOOSING 52 (22, 30) 18 (8, 10) 0.35 0.0177 
Total 104 (48, 56) 30 (14, 16) 0.29 0.0000 
       
All 210 (100, 110) 77 (40, 37) 0.37 0.0001 
 
We comment first on the results for the BASELINE and TASTING treatments. While the 
swap rates for these treatments have the expected pattern with BASELINE < TASTING < 0.5, 
neither has a statistically significant endowment effect. The absence of an endowment effect 
in the BASELINE treatment is noteworthy, and we examine this further in Section 5. Its 
absence, however, means that we cannot conduct a meaningful test of the taste experience 
hypothesis (which would require us to look for a reduction of the endowment effect in 
TASTING relative to BASELINE).  
We now test the choice experience hypothesis by comparing behaviour between the 
PASSIVE and CHOOSING treatments. There is a significant endowment effect in the 
PASSIVE treatment (the trading rate is only 0.23) and the experience of choosing weakens it. 
In line with the choice experience hypothesis, the trading rate rises to 0.35 for the CHOOSING 
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treatment where subjects are approximately 50% more likely to trade. This treatment difference 
just fails to reach significance at the 10% level (p= 0.1023, Boschloo test with one-sided 
alternative hypothesis) though we do also find a (weakly) significant effect of choice 
experience in the individual-level analysis below (see analysis of Table 2). 
An unanticipated feature of our results is the difference between the treatments in which the 
acquisition of endowments occurred in two steps (PASSIVE, CHOOSING), rather than one 
step (BASELINE, TASTING). While 44% of subjects swapped in the one-step treatments, only 
29% of subjects did so in two-step treatments (p= 0.0190, Boschloo test with two-sided 
alternative hypothesis). Comparing the BASELINE and PASSIVE treatments, which control 
for the experiences of choosing between and tasting the goods, respectively 42% and 23% of 
subjects swapped their endowment (p=0.0461, Boschloo test, two-sided alternative 
hypothesis). These tests evidence that acquiring an endowment in stages strengthens the 
endowment effect. We think this is an intriguing discovery and briefly discuss its interpretation 
and potential significance in Section 6. 
We supplement the analysis of treatment effects by using logit regression (following List, 
2003) to model the probability that a subject swaps, taking account of individual characteristics. 
Observations from all treatments are pooled. This provides a clear overall view of treatment 
effects within the models we estimate (specifically models 3 and 5) and increases the statistical 
power of the tests. Across different specifications, as independent variables, we included a 
dummy for the treatment, the individual experiences, plus a set of individual-level 
characteristics elicited in the post-decision questionnaire, including age and gender. We also 
included a measure of individual-level loss aversion constructed by ranking subjects’ from least 
to most loss averse based on their responses to a series of hypothetical tasks (see supplementary 
materials). The results are reported in Table 2.  
Model 1, which includes only a constant, provides a simple econometric test for the presence 
of an endowment effect. The highly significant negative coefficient confirms the presence of 
an endowment effect in our data.  
In all three models that include individual-level characteristics (Models 2, 4 and 5), the 
coefficient for measured loss aversion is negative (other characteristics are never significant). 
Tests of the null hypothesis that the swap rate is independent of loss aversion are rejected at 
the 5% level (Model 2, p=0.0436; Model 4, p=0.0424; Model 5, p=0.0369). Hence, in these 
data, more loss averse individuals were less likely to trade. While this result supports theories, 
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including LOS, which invoke loss aversion to explain the endowment effect, we note that we 
do not replicate this association in the follow-up study reported in Section 5. 
Models 3 and 5 provide evidence that the experience of choosing part of the endowment 
increases the trading rate (and reduces the endowment effect). Tests of the null hypothesis that 
the trading rates in the PASSIVE and CHOOSING treatments are equal are rejected at the 10% 
level in favour of the alternative hypothesis that the trading rate is higher in the CHOOSING 
treatment (model 3, p= 0.0898; model 5, p= 0.0894).    
Table 2: Logit analysis of swap decisions 
 
   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Constant -0.55*** 
(0.14) 
-1.09 
(1.82) 
-0.47 
(0.32) 
-1.49 
(1.86) 
-1.55 
(1.91) 
      
Female  -0.33 
(0.29) 
 -0.37 
(0.30) 
-0.37 
(0.30) 
Age  0.05 
(0.09) 
 0.09 
(0.09) 
0.09 
(0.09) 
Loss aversion  -0.88* 
(0.51) 
 -0.90* 
(0.52) 
-0.93* 
(0.52) 
      
Endowed crisps  0.36 
(0.29) 
0.29 
(0.29) 
0.34 
(0.30) 
0.37 
(0.30) 
      
TASTING   0.19 
(0.39) 
 0.24 
(0.40) 
PASSIVE   -0.89** 
(0.44) 
 -0.94** 
(0.44) 
CHOOSING   -0.29 
(0.41) 
 -0.34 
(0.42) 
Two-step    -0.75** 
(0.30) 
 
n 210 210 210 210 210 
The dependent variable is 1 if the subject traded, 0 otherwise. Female is 1 if the subject was female, 0 otherwise. 
Age is measured in years. Loss aversion ranges from 0 (least averse) to 1 (most averse). Endowed crisps is 1 if the 
subject received a crisps-rich endowment, 0 otherwise. The next three variables are dummies to identify treatments. 
Two-step is 1 for treatments where endowment is received in instalments. Estimates are logit coefficients (standard 
errors in parentheses). *Denotes significance at the p < .1 level; ** at the p<.05 level; *** at the p<.001 level.  
 
Finally, this analysis confirms that acquiring endowments in two steps decreases the trading 
rate (increases the endowment effect). This is evidenced by the significant negative coefficients 
on PASSIVE in Models 3 and 5 and by the significant coefficient for ‘Two-step’ in Model 4.  
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5. Follow-up experiment 
A notable feature of the above results is our failure to find a significant endowment effect in 
our BASELINE treatment, which is closest to the classic swapping task of Knetsch (1989).  In 
this section, we report a simple follow-up experiment designed to diagnose that result.6 
The most obvious difference between our experiment and other comparable studies which 
have found an endowment effect is that we endowed subjects with bundles of goods rather than 
single items. For instance, in Knetsch’s study, subjects who swapped their endowment were 
giving up their only mug or only chocolate bar; whereas, in our experiment, subjects were 
giving up only one of two packets of crisps or one of two bottles of lemonade. It is possible 
that loss aversion may be more acute in situations where one would be giving up the last unit 
of a good. However, since there is some evidence that the extent of an endowment effect may 
depend on the nature of the goods being traded (e.g. Isoni et al., 2011), another possibility is 
that the absence of an endowment effect in our BASELINE treatment is explained by features 
of the relatively unfamiliar goods which subjects encountered in our experiment. Our follow-
up experiment discriminates between these possibilities. 
The follow-up experiment had two treatments. The first replicated our original BASELINE 
treatment; the second was the same except that endowments were single items of one or other 
of two unfamiliar goods (as in our original experiment, the two goods were either a bottle of 
an unfamiliar brand of lemonade or a packet of an unfamiliar brand of vegetable crisps). The 
experiments were conducted at the University of Exeter.  A total of 184 subjects participated, 
with 92 in each treatment. Within each treatment, half of the subjects had each endowment. 
We used more subjects per treatment in the follow-up experiment to increase statistical power. 
If the effect size has Cohen's h=0.4 (approximately the difference between a 0.3 and a 0.5 swap 
rate) and the significance level is 0.05, 92 subjects per treatment gives 99% power for within 
treatment tests for an endowment effect and 77% power for between treatment tests for 
differences in swap rates. Testing for smaller effect sizes requires considerably more 
observations. 
In the baseline replication (with bundles), there were 39 swaps (28 to lemonade, 11 to 
crisps). This replicates the BASELINE finding reported in Section 4: the swap rate (0.42 in the 
follow-up) is very similar and there is no statistically significant endowment effect. In the 
single items treatment, there were 33 swaps (31 to lemonade, 2 to crisps).  The swap rate was 
0.36, giving a statistically significant endowment effect (p=0.0003, Boschloo test with one-
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sided alternative hypothesis). These results clearly implicate the use of bundles (as opposed to 
unfamiliar goods) as the culprit for eliminating the endowment effect in our original 
BASELINE treatment.7  
6. Discussion and conclusion 
Our initial design was set up to test two hypotheses partly motivated by existing theory and 
evidence: the taste uncertainty hypothesis and the choice experience hypothesis. 
We find some evidence that the experience of having made a straight choice between a pair 
of goods reduces the endowment effect observed in a later swap task involving those same 
goods. While we have found only modest support for this effect, there is a case for further 
investigation because the operation of it appears to cohere with emerging theory and evidence. 
From a theoretical viewpoint, the choice experience hypothesis can be interpreted as an 
implication of the LOS model. We view this theory as an attractive putative account of our data 
because it models mechanisms which may explain not only why the endowment effect occurs, 
but also why it changes as a consequence of particular types of experience. From an empirical 
viewpoint, we see a possible parallel with Engelmann and Hollard (2010). They conjectured 
that endowment effects may be partly caused by individuals having biased assessments of the 
costs associated with trading (including mental costs associated with bargaining or deciding). 
To test this hypothesis, their experiment forced some subjects to trade before they encountered 
swapping tasks and subjects who had traded as a consequence of this ‘therapy’ exhibited no 
endowment effect. The reduced endowment effect in our CHOOSING treatment may be 
evidence that exercising choice on route to an endowment had a comparable ‘therapeutic’ role. 
We were unable to test the taste uncertainty hypothesis because, counter to our expectations, 
we found no endowment effect in our BASELINE condition. We suggested that the most likely 
candidates for explaining this are one or both of two differences between our BASELINE 
treatment and a classic swaps design. The first candidate is that we used unfamiliar goods and 
second is that, in order to facilitate our test of the choice experience hypothesis, subjects chose 
between bundles of goods rather than single items. Our follow-up experiment provides clear 
evidence that the use of bundles (not the unfamiliarity of the goods) is the factor which most 
likely suppressed the endowment effect in our BASELINE treatment. Although it was not part 
of our initial strategy to test the influence of bundles, we view this aspect of our results as 
identifying a psychologically plausible determinant of the endowment effect. That is, people 
are less prone to it when they do not have to give up their final unit of an endowed good. 
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A final intriguing finding is that even though there was no endowment effect for bundles 
acquired in a single step, it re-emerged for bundles acquired in two steps. This result, while 
unanticipated, is possibly related to so-called “splitting effects” reported across a broad range 
of decision contexts (e.g. Starmer and Sugden, 1993; Humphrey, 1995; Bateman et al. 1997; 
Weber, et al. 1998).8 The common feature of splitting effects is a tendency for a good to be 
more highly valued when re-described so that positive attributes are unpacked into sub-
components (e.g. the ‘high performance” of a car may be unpacked into sub-categories such as 
“acceleration”, “handling” etc.). If splitting effects in bundle acquisition do promote 
endowment effects, the latter may be particularly pronounced in markets where endowments 
are built up over time. These may range from markets for relatively low value goods (e.g. 
memorabilia collections) through to economically large investments such as building a home 
or a business.  
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Notes  
1 Horowitz and McConnell (2002) review many of these studies; see also Plott and Zeiler (2005) and 
Isoni et al. (2011) for further discussion of the interpretation of endowment effects. 
2 LOS do not presume that an individual is necessarily self-conscious of their intrinsic uncertainty but 
we think the restaurant choice example provides an everyday illustration of the underlying idea, 
consistent with their model. 
3 Taste uncertainty might explain why endowment effects occur for some goods but not others.  For 
example, Isoni et al. (2011) observe an endowment effect for lotteries (which are intrinsically 
uncertain) but not mugs. 
4 Subjects were not told the distribution of the top-ups, so did not know their choice would have no 
effect on their second-stage allocation.  
5 The Boschloo test was chosen for two reasons.  First, it is an exact test.  Unlike the Z-test of 
proportions or the Chi-squared test, the Boschloo test does not rely on using an approximation of the 
test statistic’s distribution.  Second, unlike Fisher’s exact test, the Boschloo test does not rely on 
contingency tables having fixed row and column totals.  In the experiment, the row totals (number of 
subjects in a treatment) were fixed, but the column totals (e.g. total trades across treatments) were not.    
6 We thank the editor and a referee for suggesting we develop a diagnostic follow-up experiment.  
7 In the follow-up experiment, subjects also completed an incentivized loss aversion elicitation task 
(details are included in the supplementary materials).  In contrast to the first experiment, we did not 
find a statistically significant correlation between measured loss aversion and swapping. 
8 Another possibility is that it is related to evidence that the valuation of an endowment is increasing 
with the duration the endowment has been held (Strahilevitz and Loewenstein, 1998). In our 
experiment, however, the durational difference between one and two-step treatments is very small.    
                                                     
